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ABSTRACT 
Attacks on information security continue to result in large losses for organizations. 
Oftentimes, the breaches occur because organizational insiders fail to adhere to commonplace 
system security messages. This could be because, faced with the challenges and time demands of 
everyday stressors, security policy compliance can be costly for individuals; security actions 
require time and distract attention from other primary tasks. To defend against these attacks, user 
interactions with security messages need to be better understood. 
This study reports the results of a 110-participant MTurk field study that examines user 
interactions with interruptive security messages through the lens of a risk tradeoff paradigm. 
First, a gap in the information security literature is identified, wherein findings about low 
security-message attention are contrasted against studies that assume attention and information 
processing. Three competing hypotheses are proposed that describe different patterns of risk 
analysis that users may engage in when interacting with an interruptive security message: (1) 
very little to no elaboration over the risk-taking decision due to perniciously low attention, (2) 
consistent security message risk-taking decision elaboration, and (3) a bimodal situation where 
elaboration depends on the information security risk-reward tradeoff balance. Multiple 
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behavioral dependent variables are corroborated to support the third hypothesis, suggesting the 
existence of a bimodal risk tradeoff paradigm for user interactions with interruptive security 
messages. The relevance of the findings for research and practice are discussed. 
Keywords: interruptive security messages, risk tradeoff, heuristic-systematic model, attention 
INTRODUCTION 
Abundant stories in media reports about organizations falling victim to security hacks 
describe huge financial and operational damage from those attacks. While the victims would 
often have the public believe that these hacks are the result of “highly sophisticated” attack 
vectors (Gallagher 2016), the reality is that the breaches often grow from simple inlets, including 
users who fail to observe basic security policies such as using caution when opening unsolicited 
email attachments. Even simple social engineering attack vectors such as these can have 
disastrous, potentially life-threatening consequences. For example, security researchers have 
observed devastating ransomware being delivered via phishing attacks and infected software and 
documents (Goodin 2016). These attacks count on users to ignore commonplace security 
messages, such as the Microsoft Office macro warning (Goodin 2016; Schneier 2011). 
Information security research has explored why individuals violate security policies and 
fall victim to attacks. Some studies make an underlying assumption that users make active risk-
taking assessments for every security decision, prompted by security messages (Boss et al. 2015; 
Johnston et al. 2015). A “lazy user” perspective depicts security as an unnecessary burden that 
should be bypassed if possible. Many studies use deterrence theory, testing the efficacy of using 
sanctions to influence security-related decision making (e.g., D'Arcy and Herath 2011; Johnston 
et al. 2015). Another camp takes the position that “users are not the enemy” (Adams and Sasse 
1999), eschewing criminology-inspired sanctioning deterrence, and attributing security 
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misbehavior largely to inattention and habituation (e.g., Anderson et al. 2016a; Anderson et al. 
2016c). In this view, if a security message is ignored, the design of the interface is to blame. We 
question how these two stances coexist – purposeful risk-taking security decision making does 
not seem congruous with inattentive dismissal of security messages. 
The purpose of this study is to attempt to reconcile the differences between the two 
camps of research on user interactions with security messages. In our study, we employ a 
between-subjects repeated-measures field study using Amazon Mechanical Turk with 110 
subjects. In our design, we influence the risk-taking tradeoff by varying the value of adhering to 
security messages. Corroborating several dependent variables, including security choice, reaction 
times, and mouse-cursor movements measures, we discover an interesting bimodal pattern where 
elevated attention and risk-taking elaboration are present only until the risk tradeoff passes a 
certain threshold.  
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
SECURITY MESSAGE INATTENTION 
A major contributor to security message failure is a simple lack of attention (see 
Anderson et al. 2016b). Inattention to security messages has been attributed to a neurobiological 
process wherein users reach a state of habituation after repeated exposure: when presented with a 
security message, a user draws on memory to inform a response instead of actively reviewing 
and elaborating the current message. While habituation has been blamed in several studies for 
observed security message disregard (Bravo-Lillo et al. 2014; Bravo-Lillo et al. 2013), NeuroIS 
tools including fMRI (Anderson et al. 2016c) and eye tracking (Anderson et al. 2016a) have 
directly measured habituation processes and reliance on memory. Changing the appearance of 
the warning message has been effective in combatting habituation (Anderson et al. 2016c).  
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Alarmingly, some of the studies have found no differences in user reactions to security 
messages even when the severity of the communicated threat is increased (e.g., Bravo-Lillo et al. 
2014; Schechter et al. 2007). However, these studies do not claim that users perceive higher 
levels of threat despite the message having changed. Indeed, often in these studies, nuanced 
changes are not perceived at all due to habituation’s recall rather than active processing of 
changed stimuli. 
Drawing on these attention findings, one possible pattern is that users rarely engage in 
risk-taking assessments when interacting with security messages, regardless of varying levels of 
tradeoff in the risk-taking decision. This would suggest that users are habituated to the messages, 
and are performing automatic, learned responses when encountering new ones. If this is true, 
then research should focus mainly on fostering attention to the messages, so as to increase the 
likelihood that users will engage with the messages and make meaningful choices. 
H1: There will be no difference in markers of cognition between varying risk-taking 
tradeoff levels (i.e., there will be no evidence of risk-taking assessments). 
RISK TRADEOFFS 
Risk has been studied in an information security context typically through the lens of 
protection motivation theory (Rogers 1983), wherein the constructs of threat severity and threat 
susceptibility essentially represent the security threat’s risk levels (Boss et al. 2015; Johnston et 
al. 2015; Johnston and Warkentin 2010). Individual differences in risk perceptions have also 
been used to predict security message disregard (Vance et al. 2014). 
In this study, we consider a different facet of information security risk -- the risk tradeoff 
associated with adhering to the security message. Inherent in the idea of risk is that there is 
something to be gained from taking the risk. In the finance literature, risk tradeoff is quantifiable 
as the potential return on investment, with willingness to accept the risk being a function of the 
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magnitude of the return (Ghysels et al. 2005). This same concept of risk-taking behavior being 
positively associated with the potential gains or loss-avoidance involved has also been described 
in the behavioral economics literature (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
Risk-tradeoff applies to the context of information security messages in that one risks a 
security threat in exchange for some benefit. Guo et al. (2011) captures the motivation to 
intentionally violate organizational information security policies with their "relative advantage 
for job performance [from violating a policy]" measure. Interruptive security messages often 
block or hinder users from completing their primary tasks (Jenkins et al. 2016). Observance of 
the security policy adds stress and requires more effort to complete the primary task. Failing to 
complete the task or taking longer to complete it may lead to poor employee performance 
evaluations (Lowry and Moody 2015). To capture these tradeoffs, we will vary the “penalties” 
associated with heeding the message, while holding constant security threat severity and 
susceptibility. 
We use the risk-taking paradigm to propose an alternative to H1, wherein users nearly 
always engage in risk-taking assessments when encountering security messages, with the degree 
of security decision elaboration depending on the tradeoff weights. This view assumes that 
attention is sufficiently present to prompt risk-tradeoff appraisals, and supports studying the 
impact of levels of perceived risk on users’ security message risk-taking assessments. Those 
tradeoff assessments can be discerned if greater evidence of elaboration and cognition is present 
as the tradeoff scale is increasingly tipped. 
H2: The pattern of risk-taking will be linear: the markers of cognition will linearly 
increase, dependent on the level of risk-taking tradeoff. 
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COGNITIVE ELABORATION AS A FUNCTION OF RISK-TRADEOFF BALANCE 
The third hypothesis combines aspects of the first two, drawing from principles of the 
heuristic-systematic model of information processing (HSM) (Chen and Chaiken 1999) to 
predict whether a user will cognitively engage with a security warning. HSM, a theory of 
persuasion, finds early expression in the script concept (Abelson 1981). The script concept 
asserts that an individual will follow a “script” and grant small requests without cognitive 
elaboration, as long as a reason is given. Individuals will be likely to perform this script unless 
(1) the script is broken by not providing a reason or if (2) the request is large, in which case they 
will elaborate over the request and the reason before deciding whether to accept it.  
We predict that the perceived risks involved will impact whether or not a user elaborates 
over a security-message decision. To our knowledge, while HSM has been evaluated in a risk 
judgement paradigm (Trumbo 2002), the impact of the balance of the risk tradeoff has not been 
examined in an HSM frame. We will manipulate the risks involved for heeding the warning. If 
the script theory concept or HSM elaboration prediction holds, we expect to see a bimodal 
distribution of behavior across risk levels, where after a certain threshold of risk tradeoff for 
adhering to the message is surpassed, elaboration will be much less likely. From the habituation-
theory lens, the scripted behavior would rely on memory and pay little attention to the security 
message (c.f. Böhme and Köpsell 2010; Sunshine et al. 2009). The tradeoff behavior will involve 
whatever task was interrupted by the security message. If adhering to the message will not 
adversely impact the interrupted task, elaboration over the decision should be more likely to 
occur. In summary, we posit that if users perceive that the benefits of heeding a warning are 
close to the accompanying losses (e.g., time lost or inability to complete an objective), then they 
will more carefully consider the risk tradeoff before making a decision. However, if the tradeoff 
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choice is clear, then users will be less likely to engage in elaboration, and instead their behavior 
will more closely follow patterns of lower attention and automatic choices. 
H3: The pattern of risk-taking will be modal. The risk decision will be elaborated over, 
as long as a threshold of risk-benefit balance has not been exceeded.  
 
We note that our hypotheses are mutually exclusive. They each describe different 
patterns of attention and risk-taking assessments that users may follow. 
METHODOLOGY 
We used a field study with a between-subjects repeated-measures design. We recruited 
110 participants from the United States using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. Participants 
were directed to a server under our control running our experiment codebase, built on the 
psiTurk framework (McDonnell et al. 2012), where they were randomly assigned to one of three 
treatment groups. Data from Mechanical Turk has been found to be as reliable as data from other 
U.S. survey panels (Steelman et al. 2014), and more importantly, they are likely to be using their 
own computers, raising their sense of perceived risk (c.f. Boss et al. 2015; Vance et al. 2014). 
We used an IRB-approved deception protocol. The pretense was that participants were 
performing an image classification task, when in reality, we were interested in users’ behaviors 
when they were presented with interruptive security messages. The image classification ruse and 
the security warning presentation are described below. 
Participants performed a modified version of the image classification task described in 
Vance et al. (2014). In our task, participants were told that they would classify a series of images 
in order to help test a computer classification algorithm. It was explained that a series of live, 
external websites would be loaded into a frame in the center of the webpage (i.e., an iframe 
HTML element). For each page load, participants were asked to classify whether the image was 
a photograph of Batman or an artist’s rendering. On top of a $1.00 base payment, participants 
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were offered an additional $1.00 performance-based bonus payment. Each incorrect 
classification results in a “penalty” decrease in their bonus payment, with the penalty amount 
depending on a participant’s treatment group. Three penalty level treatment groups were used: 5, 
10, and 25 cents. We chose these increments because they mapped naturally to U.S. coinage. 
Furthermore, to encourage attention to the task, we warned that too many incorrect responses 
would result in their work being rejected with forfeiture of any payment. Participants’ current 
bonus status was depicted with an animated and labeled bar beneath the central iframe. 
Participants were encouraged to move quickly, limiting them to a maximum of 10 seconds for 
each classification. A timeout resulted in the classification being marked as “incorrect.” After a 
4-image practice round, participants classified 75 images. See Figure 1 for an example 
screenshot of the image classification protocol. 
Five times during the task, the page load within the central window was interrupted with 
a browser security warning. The warning, based on Google Chrome malware warning build 
51.0.2704.63 m, signaled that continuing to load the page would result in the visitor’s computer 
becoming infected with malicious software (“malware”). The warning had a button allowing the 
user to proceed past the warning to the website (see Figure 2). 
If, while a security warning was shown, participants made a guess about whether the 
image on the unseen screen was real or animated, they risked being marked wrong. Because each 
incorrect classification decreased the bonus earned and increased the likelihood of a participant’s 
work being rejected, participants were financially motivated to ignore the warning. 
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METRICS 
We consider various markers of security behaviors and cognition. First, we test for differences in 
actual security message adherence (choosing to load the site despite the warning) among 
treatment groups. Second, we test for differences in reaction time among treatment groups. 
Reaction time, a form of mental chronology, is a commonly-used metric for cognitive effort 
(Jensen 2006). Third, we test for differences in cognitive engagement by examining area under 
the curve (AUC), a mouse-cursor movement statistic (Hibbeln et al. 2016; Jenkins et al. 2016). 
For AUC, the more the line connecting the mouse cursor starting and ending point for a security 
warning impression deviated from a straight-line trajectory, the greater the evidence of higher 
levels of cognitive processing. 
RESULTS 
WARNING ADHERENCE RATES 
To test for differences in adherence rates (whether a participant ignored a warning), we 
performed an empirical logit analysis (Barr 2008). We specified a fixed effect for treatment 
group, a fixed effect for the number of warnings seen, and a random intercept for each 
participant. An ANOVA found significant differences among treatment groups on whether the 
warning was ignored, 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝜒2(2) = 11.502, 𝑝 = .003. Averaged across warning exposures, 
participants in the 5-cent penalty treatment group were 32% less likely to ignore the warning 
  
Figure 1 – Example of image classification task 
demonstrating loaded page window and task 
control panel (adapted from Vance et al. 2014). 
Figure 2 – The security warning as it appeared to 
participants. Based on the Google Chrome malware 
warning, from build version 51.0.2704.63 m 
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than were participants in the 10-cent penalty treatment group (𝑝 =  .001), and 39% less likely to 
ignore the warning than participants in the 25-cent penalty treatment group (𝑝 <  .001). 
However, there were no significant differences among log odds comparing the 10-cent group to 
the 25-cent group. Furthermore, while there was an overall 5% increase in the odds of ignoring 
the warning for each additional warning exposure (𝑝 = .021), there was no interaction between 
treatment group and number of warnings seen (𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝜒2(2) = .875, 𝑝 = .646). Model 
parameters are graphically displayed in Figure 3. 
REACTION TIME 
We tested for the impact of treatment group on a log transformation of reaction time 
using a linear mixed model with random intercept for each participant, along with fixed effects 
for treatment condition, number of warnings seen, plus an interaction between the fixed effects. 
Significant differences were found on time taken among the treatment groups, 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝜒2(2) =
7.684, 𝑝 = .022. Averaging across warning exposures, participants in the 5-cent treatment group 
had 22.7% slower reaction times than did participants in the 10-cent treatment group (𝑝 = .008), 
and 15.1% slower reaction times than participants in the 25-cent treatment group, (𝑝 = .075). 
There were no significant differences between reaction times averaged across warning exposures 
for participants in the 10-cent group compared to the 25-cent treatment group (𝑝 = .430). Also, 
the interaction effect of penalty treatment and number of warnings seen was not statistically 
significant, 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝜒2(2) = 1.642, 𝑝 = .440. See Figure 4. 
MOUSE-CURSOR MOVEMENT  
We performed analyses on the log-transformation of the length-normalized AUC. For our 
first analysis of this dependent variable, we only considered the first warning exposure for each 
participant. Significant differences were found among the treatment groups on AUC, 𝐹(2,95) =
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3.198, 𝑝 = .045. Post-hoc analyses indicated that participants in the 5-cent treatment group had 
marginally higher AUC than did participants in either the 10-cent treatment group or the 25-cent 
treatment group (𝑝 = .055 and 𝑝 = .022 respectively). No significant differences were found in 
AUC between participants in the 10- and 25-cent treatment groups (𝑝 = .681). 
 Next, we added a fixed effect to the model, counting each warning seen for each 
participant, a fixed effect for the interaction between treatment group and number of warnings 
seen, plus a random intercept for each participant. Unlike the first analysis, this analysis only 
found the main effect of number of warnings seen to be significant (𝜒2(1) = 16.559, 𝑝 < .001). 
Neither the interaction effect nor the main effect of treatment group were found to be significant 
(p = .295 and p = .205 respectively). See the Loess curve in Figure 5. 
DISCUSSION 
We tested for differences on various outcomes: (1) actual adherence rates, (2) reaction 
times, and (3) mouse cursor movement AUC. For the actual adherence rates, participants who 
were only penalized 5 cents per incorrect answer were much less likely to ignore the warning 
than participants who were penalized either 10-cents or 25-cents per incorrect response. This was 
expected – a penalty of 10 cents and 25 cents represented losses of 10% and 25% of the available 
$1.00 bonus that participants stood to earn, respectively. Using a risk tradeoff paradigm, 
  
 
Figure 3 – Empirical logistic 
regression for did_ignore 
Figure 4 – Loess curve for 
reaction time, untransformed DV 
Figure 5 – Loess curve of AUC 
over repeated exposures  
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participants appeared to be more likely to trade 5% of their bonus to avoid a security risk than 
they were to trade either 10% or 25%. One interesting observation is that there were no observed 
differences in adherence rates between the 10-cent and 25-cent treatment groups. This suggests 
that the risk-analysis tradeoff that individuals engage in is not linear, but rather, that it is modal, 
supporting H3. In this study, a 10% penalty – a mere 5% increase over the lower treatment group 
– was sufficient to boost substantially the rates of ignoring security warning–by 20%. Individuals 
at work may engage in these risk-taking tradeoffs when they are interrupted by security 
messages. Time lost through adhering to the security warning and finding a workaround may 
result in negative outcomes such as missing a work deadline. Depending on the weight of these 
negative outcomes compared to the perceived benefits of avoiding the security threat, similar 
warning adherence patterns as seen in our study may be observed in the workplace.  
By comparing these results to our other outcome measures indicative of attention and 
cognitive processing across treatment groups, we gain insights into the level of cognition and 
attention that participants exhibited. Participants in the 5-cent treatment group had the longest 
reaction times to the warnings, even across multiple exposures. All else equal, longer reaction 
times in decision-making are suggestive of greater levels of attention and cognition (Jensen 
2006). Therefore, the faster reaction times in the 10-cent and 25-cent penalty groups suggest that 
participants viewed their choice as being more straightforward. The same pattern of results 
between treatment groups was seen in the analysis of mouse-cursor movement AUC for first 
warning impressions. We know from the analysis of the adherence data that participants were 
more likely to ignore the warning in these higher penalty groups. We can therefore begin to 
make the case that automatic, mindless reactions to security messages are more likely after a risk 
tradeoff threshold is surpassed. But, participants apparently do not indiscriminately ignore all 
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warnings. Participants in the 5-cent treatment group appeared to be more likely to engage in risk-
benefit tradeoff decision-making and to elaborate over the security decisions. In short, 
participants do not always respond mindlessly to security messages, rejecting H1. But these 
results suggest that they often do, rejecting H2. 
It is worth nothing that when differences were tested for AUC averaged across time, no 
differences were found. Only the differences in group intercepts (the first warning impressions) 
were statistically significant. This may be explained by participants only engaging in the risk-
taking elaboration once. Future security warning decisions may have been similar enough to the 
first that re-elaboration was not necessary. This observation of a decrease in elaboration over 
repeated exposures is in line with the principle of habituation to security messages (c.f. Anderson 
et al. 2016a; Anderson et al. 2016b; Anderson et al. 2016c).  
A greater number of treatment groups would be necessary to determine the number of 
modes for interruptive security warning risk-taking decisions. For situations where the tradeoff 
quantification is less immediately quantifiable than our money-penalty operationalization, a 
model would be useful to describe what perceptual factors best predict the tradeoff values that 
participants use when they engage in evaluation of the security message risk-taking tradeoff. 
Such a model could build on the information security policy violation intention models already 
in existence (e.g., D'Arcy and Herath 2011). Organizations can modify their incentive structures 
to decrease the tradeoff amount that organizational insiders discern when considering whether to 
adhere to a warning, perhaps through threat of sanctions for non-security-message adherence 
(D'Arcy and Herath 2011; Johnston et al. 2015), or through rewards for good security hygiene. 
Security message design can also aim to boost perceptions of threat severity and susceptibility, 
which may also tip the risk-tradeoff decision further.  
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CONCLUSION 
This study has investigated a gap in information security literature between assumptions 
of high and low user attention to interruptive security messages. Using an interruptive security 
message context, the corroboration of multiple dependent variables from a field study supported 
the existence of users behaving under a bimodal risk tradeoff paradigm, where security message 
elaboration was dependent on the risk tradeoff balance between the perceived information threat 
and the losses involved in not being able to perform the interrupted task. Future research should 
be performed to further investigate users’ risk perceptions when interacting with interruptive 
security messages, including how to manipulate these perceptions. This line of inquiry holds 
great promise for both research and practice. 
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